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MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
IN AML AND CYBERSECURITY AT NEW
YORK’S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Harry Dixon*
Cybersecurity in the financial sector is of paramount importance. Due to significant cyber
intrusions affecting some of the world’s biggest banks, in September 2016 New York’s
Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) proposed regulations requiring banks and
insurance companies to establish cybersecurity programs and designate an internal cybersecurity
officer. These rules became final in March 2017. Described as a “first-in-the-nation” effort,
the regulations will only affect banks and other financial services providers in New York.
However, given New York’s outsized influence on the financial services industry, it is likely
that this will set a precedent for both state and federal regulators. Thus, NYDFS would do
well to set a good precedent.
Unfortunately, at least some of the rules need serious improvement. In particular, the proposed
regulations require that either the chairperson of the board or a senior officer certify that the
firm’s cybersecurity program meets the proposal’s requirements. Those submitting the
certification could be held individually liable if the organization’s cybersecurity program is
deficient. This liability includes civil and criminal penalties.
However, this contrasts with NYDFS’s rule regarding anti-money laundering (“AML”) and
Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) transaction monitoring and filtering programs.
Under those rules, there are no criminal penalties for individual directors. Because recent
developments in financial institutions suggest that AML policy and cybersecurity policy are
significantly intertwined and are not easily separable; to track consistency with developments in
federal law pertaining to individual liability in corporations; and to maintain consistency and
clarity in the law, the NYDFS should, where appropriate, allow its regulators to pursue
criminal liability against individuals.
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INTRODUCTION

Everyday hackers attack financial institutions for a variety of
motives. Some hackers target financial institutions for money, others,
for “the lulz.” Still, others hack financial institutions for political
motivations because by doing so, they may cause damage to the
global economy.
In any of these scenarios the potential for damage is
significant. For example, in 2013 a Kiev ATM began randomly
dispensing money throughout the day.1 When a Russian
cybersecurity firm began to investigate, they discovered that the ATM
was only the tip of the iceberg: malware had severely penetrated the
bank’s computers, even sending back video feeds of employees
conducting routine tasks throughout the day. 2 The criminal group –
comprised of Chinese, Russians, and Europeans – were then able to
impersonate bank officers, turn on various cash machines, and
transfer millions of dollars from banks throughout the world into
dummy accounts.3
The largest financial institution hack in U.S. history highlights
the damages a hack can cause. The United States Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York charged Gery Shalon, Joshua
Samuel Aron, and Ziv Orenstein in a 23-count indictment in
November of 2015.4 In addition to charging the men with securities
fraud and money laundering, the indictment alleged that the men had
stolen the personal information of more than 100 million
customers.5 As these examples demonstrate, cybersecurity in the
financial sector is of paramount importance.
Due to these attacks, along with other significant cyber
intrusions affecting some of the world’s biggest banks, the New
1 David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Bank Hackers Steal Millions via Malware,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/
world/bank-hackers-steal-millions-via-malware.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 U.S. v. Shalon, Aaron, and Orenstein, No. 15-cr-333 (S.D. N.Y. 2015).
5 Id.
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York’s Department of Financial Services [hereinafter “NYDFS”]
proposed regulations6 requiring banks and insurance companies to
establish cybersecurity programs and designate an internal
cybersecurity officer in September of 2016.7 These regulations were
the result of years of research that probed weaknesses in financial
institutions and then asked for feedback from those institutions
regarding their efforts to strengthen their cybersecurity regimes. The
results established the groundwork for the basic regulations, subject
to a public comment period that closed in November of 2016. The
rules became effective on March 1st, 2017.
Described as a “first-in-the-nation” effort,8 the regulations
will only affect banks and other financial services providers in New
York; nevertheless, only is a relative term. Given New York’s outsized
influence on the financial services industry the rules will set a
precedent for cybersecurity within financial institutions, and, both
state and federal regulators may use the rules as a framework for their
own cybersecurity rules and regulations. Thus, it is important that the
NYDFS set a rigorous, clear standard that reflects reality and assesses
liability where appropriate.
Unfortunately, the NYDFS has unintentionally created a
conflict amongst their rules. The cybersecurity regulations require
either the chairperson of the board or a senior officer certify the
firm’s cybersecurity program meets the proposal’s requirements in an
annual certification.9 Those submitting the certification can be held
Hereinafter, unless specified otherwise, the terms “regulations” or “the
regulations” should be assumed to be referring to the DFS’s proposed regulations
discussed here.
7 Sanger & Pelroth, supra note 2.
8 Governor Cuomo, Press Release, Governor Cuomo Announces Proposal of Firstin-the-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation to Protect Consumers and Financial Institutions,
OFFICIAL NEWS FROM THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR (September 13, 2016),
available at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announcesproposal-first-nation-cybersecurity-regulation-protect-consumers-and
[hereinafter
“Governor Cuomo Press Release”].
9 23 NYCRR 500: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services
Companies, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS., Section 500.00 (Feb. 2017), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/rf23-nycrr500_cybersecurity.pdf.
6
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individually liable if the organization’s cybersecurity program is
deficient.10 This liability includes civil and criminal penalties.11 Such a
program is often standard in today’s corporate culture.
This rule conflicts with NYDFS’s rule regarding anti-money
laundering [hereinafter “AML”] and Office of Foreign Assets Control
[hereinafter “OFAC”] transaction monitoring and filtering programs.
Under the AML and OFAC rules, there are no explicit criminal
penalties for individual directors, nor is there an annual certification
procedure.12 As it follows, a situation could arise where a director
would not be liable under the AML rule, but would be liable under
the cybersecurity rule.
While such a discrepancy in the rules may not seem
important, in the context of financial institutions, data breaches and
money laundering often go hand-in-hand, as demonstrated by the
above example. Indeed, given the broad scope of money laundering
laws, money laundering is almost guaranteed to occur in a data
breach of a financial institution, even if the theft only amounts to a
penny. But that is not the only reason why cybersecurity and AML
rules regarding certification should harmonize. Recent developments
in U.S. corporate liability law at the federal level may very well
influence individual corporate liability at the state level. Thus, the
NYDFS should, where appropriate, allow its regulators to pursue
criminal liability on both individuals, and the corporation. This will
create clarity in the law; reflect the reality of intertwined AML and
cybersecurity policies and close a loophole; and will track federal legal
developments.
Part II of this article will briefly explain the background of
modern individual corporate liability, cybersecurity, and money
laundering. In Part III, the proposed rules will be examined and
Id. at 500.20.
Id. at 500.20.
12 See generally NYDFS Issues Final Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Rule,
DEBEVOISE PLIMPTON (Jul. 6, 2016), http://www.debevoise.com/~/media
/files/insights/publications/2016/07/20160706_nydfs_issues_final_anti_money_l
aundering_and_sanctions_rule.pdf (discussing final changes to AML rule, including
removal of compliance rule and threat of criminal penalties).
10
11
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explained. As we will see, AML and cybersecurity are so intertwined
that it does not make sense to have different standards for what is
quickly becoming the same group. In Part IV, this author will
propose a modification in accordance with New York corporate
liability law that reflects the reality of AML and cybersecurity policy.
Part V, consists of the author’s closing remarks.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Corporate criminal liability for individuals
New York is the birthplace of corporate criminal liability. In
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States,13 the
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether Congress had
acted constitutionally when, via the Elkins Act, legislators imputed
criminal liability to a common carrier where any agents and officers
of a common carrier granted an illegal rebate. 14 The Court held that
Congress could subject a corporation to criminal punishment solely
on the basis of an agent’s conduct because the Court saw “no valid
objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable.”15
Corporate criminal liability law has existed in some capacity in
New York since at least 1948.16 In those days, the state of New York
imposed a $5,000 fine for a corporation convicted of a felony that
would lead to imprisonment.17 At the time, case law suggested that

New York Central R Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). For an
excellent discussion of this case and modern corporate criminal liability, see Andrew
Weissmann with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 INDIANA
L. J. 411, 420-421 (2013) (discussing New York Central).
14 Id. at 421.
15 N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 495.
16 See Corporate Criminal Liability in New York, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 794 (1948)
(“under the present state of law, a corporation may be liable for almost any crime
perpetrated in connection with corporate activities.”).
17 Id. at 794.
13
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directors, officers, or employees acting within the scope of their
authority could render a corporation criminally liable.18
It was around this time that a theory began to form of
holding individuals in corporations accountable for crimes. During
the Nuremberg trials after World War II, Justice Robert Jackson,
Chief Counsel for the United States at Nuremberg, stated during the
trial of industrialist Gustav Krupp that, “the great industrialists of
Germany were guilty of the crimes charged in this indictment quite as
much as its politicians, diplomats, and soldiers.”19 Other cases
followed involving industrialists committing war crimes through their
corporations.20 Still, with the exception of acts constituting war
crimes,21 or blatant statutory violations such as securities fraud, for
decades prosecuting individuals for crimes committed in connection
with their work at a corporation was uncommon.
H. David Kotz, former Inspector General at the Securities
and Exchange Commission and current Managing Director of the
Berkeley Research Group, has two theories on why this has occurred.
First, historically, companies were much more likely to engage in a
settlement process with the government, whereas individuals who
faced prison time were much more likely to fight any charges. A
recalcitrant individual is not preferable to a prosecutor, who
unfortunately tends to be overworked and is trying to resolve a case

Id. at 795 (citing, e.g., People v. Lawyers Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27
N.E. 2d 30 (1940) (illegal practice of law); People v. Woodbury Dermatological
Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908) (illegal practice of medicine); People v.
Globe Jewelers Inc. 249 App. Div. 122, 291 N.Y. Supp. 362 (1 st Dep’t 1936)
(treasurer of the corporation sent out a fake form, simulating a court order))
(footnote omitted).
19 Chatham House, What Are the Relevant Legal Principles Relating to the
Responsibility of Companies and CEOs for Violations of International Criminal Law? (2012).
20 Id.
21 See Rule 156, Definition of War Crimes, Int’l. Comm. Of Red Cross
(defined as “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in an
armed conflict not of an international character,”), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 (last visited Mar. 30,
2017).
18
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as quickly as possible.22 Secondly, and on a related note, corporations
do not face the negligence or intent requirement that individuals face
in criminal prosecutions, nor is there a priority for cases that are
novel, challenging, and difficult to prove, which shifted enforcement
away from individuals and instead towards more obvious corporate
conduct with a lower evidentiary threshold. 23
Yet, because of a flurry of disastrous financial events ranging
from Enron’s collapse to the financial meltdown of 2008, the
enforcement approach utilized by agencies has changed dramatically
in the past decade. For years critics argued that the Department of
Justice [hereinafter “DOJ”] and the Securities and Exchange
Commission [hereinafter “SEC”] were not doing much to bring civil
and criminal cases against parties involved in the 2008 financial
crisis.24 For example, in 2013 Jed Rakoff, U.S. District Court Judge of
the Southern District of New York – no stranger to fraud trials
prosecuted by the SEC –, complained that the government was not
holding individuals responsible for massive frauds, “speak[ing] greatly
to weaknesses in our prosecutorial system.”25
This sentiment set the stage for a memorandum from Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates in September 2015 that outlines a new
DOJ policy regarding individual liability in corporate contexts, which
came to be known as the “Yates Memo.”26 Since the memo, the DOJ
has increasingly imposed criminal and civil liability for individuals
conducting corporate misconduct.27 This policy also requires
Berkeley Research Paper, https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/content/
dam/openweb/documents/pdf/risk/white-paper/yates-memo-background-andits-impact-white-paper.pdf (registration required).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. (quoting Nate Raymond, Judge Criticizes Lack of Prosecution against Wall
Street Executives for Fraud, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/financial-judge-idUSL2N0IX1B620131113.
26 Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, Sally Q. Yates,
Department of Justice, Sept. 9, 2015, https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download.
27 Roberto J. Gonzalez & Jessica S. Carey, The Government’s Making AML
Enforcement Personal, NAT’L L. J. (Feb. 22, 2016), available at https://www.
paulweiss.com/media/3359752/gonzalez_carey__nlj_022216.pdf.
22
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companies to provide “all” relevant facts about “all” individuals
involved in wrong doing, regardless of “position, status, or seniority,”
in order for the company to get any kind of cooperation credit.28
The election of President Donald J. Trump makes it unclear
whether the Yates memo will continue to be enforced. A March 8,
2017 memorandum from United States Attorney General Jeff
Sessions says that violent crime will be a priority for the United States
Department of Justice.29 At least one commentator believes that in a
time of shrinking budgets, a focus on violent crime means a shift
away from white-collar crime. 30 However, as James Connelly of
Womble Carlyle in Atlanta has pointed out, federal policies change
slowly.31 Yates herself believes that the priorities laid out in her
memorandum represent core values of criminal justice and are thus
not ideological.32 For the purposes of this Article, we will assume that
the Yates Memo is indicative of a long-term trend in federal
prosecution.
Similarly, the federal government has become aggressive in
pursuing individual wrongdoing in the anti-money laundering
(“AML”) sector. In Treasury v. Haider, Civil No. 14-CV-9987
(S.D.N.Y.), the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York (acting on behalf of FinCEN at the United
States Department of Treasury) issued a 146-page complaint against
MoneyGram International’s former Chief Compliance Officer,
Timothy Haider, for the willful failure to implement an effective
Yates
Memo,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/
download.
29 Memorandum,
available
at
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/
documents/world/read-the-memo-sent-by-sessions-on-violent-offenders/2367/.
30 Bethany McLean, Why White-Collar Crooks May Be Cheering This Sessions
Memo, YAHOO (Mar. 21, 2017), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-white-collarcrooks-may-be-cheering-this-jeff-sessions-memo-133115487.html.
31 James Connelly, Trump Administration Likely to Maintain Yates Memo
Priorities on Corporate Wrongdoing, WOMBLE CARLYLE (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://www.wcsr.com/Insights/Articles/2017/February/Trump-AdministrationLikely-to-Maintain-Yates-Memo-Priorities-on-CorporateWrongdoing?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=
View-Original.
32 Id.
28
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AML compliance program or properly file suspicious activity reports,
as required under the Bank Secrecy Act.33 The acts in that case
occurred in New York, among other places. Haider allegedly failed to
implement disciplinary or termination policies, contravening legal
advice provided to Haider.34 Despite the fact that Haider had
knowledge of the fraudulent activity occurring at MoneyGram by its
agents and outlets, he continued to allow those agents and outlets to
conduct the fraud through MoneyGram’s currency transfer system.35
The complaint also alleges that Haider knew or should have known
specific agents posed an unreasonable fraud risk, which
MoneyGram’s Director of AML Compliance called “egregious and
beyond anyone’s ability to doubt that the agent and knowledge and
involvement.”36 Nevertheless, Haider did not cut ties with any agents
or outlets.37 Finally, while Haider was in charge SAR analysts were
unable to access sufficient information to file SARS because Haider
kept each department in a separate “silo.”38 Because of this, they
failed to have a coherent diligence process, and ignored warning signs
regarding authorizing new agents or outlets.39 Even though the case is
still ongoing, the thoroughness of the complaint, the magnitude of
the violations, and the District of Minnesota’s denial of Mr. Haider’s
claim that only financial institutions themselves are liable for the
failure to maintain an effective AML program, could all be harbingers
of the future.40
In terms of individual liability, in New York, “[a] person is
criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he
performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a
corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in
his own name or behalf.”41 Although this statute appears to lack a
33 FinCEN Seeks Civil Money Penalty and Injunction Against Former Chief
Compilance Officer of MoneyGram, FINCEN (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.sidley.com
/en/news/2015-02_banking_and_financial_services_update (citations omitted).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See generally Gonzalez & Carey, supra note 27.
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25 (2016).
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mens rea requirement, New York adopts the Model Penal Code’s
definitions for “purposely,” “knowingly,” “willfully,” “recklessly,”
and “negligently.”42 When a mens rea requirement is not stated in a
criminal statute, the intent is nevertheless established if the defendant
acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.43 Thus, corporate criminal
liability arises when an individual commits an offense purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly. It is unclear whether the New York
Attorney General (“NYAG”) is prioritizing individual corporate
liability, as their counterparts in Washington, D.C. are, but given the
language of New York’s final rules, described infra, as well as New
York’s reputation as the financial center of the United States, the
NYAG is likely to follow suit.
The individual liability is strongest in the cybersecurity rules,
so our discussion will begin there.
B. Cyber-Attacks
Cyber-attacks – “an attack initiated from a computer against a
website, computer system or individual computer . . . that
compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the
computer or information stored on it”44 - are not new.45 Cyberattacks take many forms, including: gaining or attempting to gain
unauthorized access to a computer system; denial of service attacks;
installation of viruses; and unauthorized use of a computer for
processing or storing data.46 The first cyber-attack occurred in 1988
when Robert Tapan Morris – a professor who now works at MIT
that was convicted for the cyber-attack – introduced the Morris
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (2016).
See generally the Model Penal Code.
44 VINCE FARHAT, BRIDGET MCCARTHY, & RICHARD R AYSMAN,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, CYBER ATTACKS: PREVENTION AND PROACTIVE
RESPONSES (2011), available at https://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication
/bd9553c5-284f-4175-87d2-849aa07920d3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/1880b6d6-eae2-4b57-8a97-9f4fb1f58b36/Cyber-attacksPreventionandProactiveRe
sponses.pdf.
45 NATO, The history of cyber attacks – a timeline, available at http://www.nato
.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm.
46 Farhat, McCarthy, and Raysman, supra note 44.
42
43
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worm to determine the size of the Internet.47 The worm replicated
itself to multiple computers through weaknesses in the UNIX system,
and slowed down those computers to the point that they were
unusable.48
At first, the most serious cyber-attacks seemed to focus on
government and military servers. For example, in the 2000s, countries
as diverse as China, Estonia, and the United States reported hacks on
various government servers, as well as hacks on private email servers
belonging to high-ranking officials.49 Nevertheless, by 2010 cyberattacks on private websites had become a frequent occurrence. To
illustrate, throughout December of 2009 and January of 2010 a group
calling itself the “Iranian Cyber Army” disrupted both Twitter and
the Chinese search engine Baidu to redirect users to a site containing
a political slogan. 50 In 2013, some South Korean financial institutions
reported a cyber infection resembling past cyber efforts by North
Korea.51
Indeed, as connectivity throughout the world has increased
over the last seventeen years, so too has cyber-attacks.52 In 2007, the
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, an arm of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), reported 12,000 cyberincidents. Because DHS defines a cyber-incident as a “violation of an
explicit or implied security policy,” and provides examples such as
denials of service, the unauthorized use of a system for processing or
storing data, and attempts to gain unauthorized access to systems or
their data,53 we may infer that cyber-incidents and cyber-attacks are
functionally similar, if not identical. By 2009, the number of cyberincidents had doubled from 2007; in 2012, the number had
NATO, supra note 45.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Brian Fung, How Many Cyberattacks Hit the United States Last Year?,
NEXTGOV (Mar. 8, 2013) http://www.nextgov.com/security/2013/03/how-manycyberattacks-hit-united-states-last-year/61775/.
53 Press Release, Department of Homeland and Security, Report Cyber
Incidents, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, available at https://www.dhs.gov/howdo-i/report-cyber-incidents (last accessed Nov. 30, 2016).
47
48
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quadrupled. It is unclear whether this result occurred due to an
increase in attacks, or due to an increase in detection. Regardless, the
number of attacks underlines the frequency of cyber-attacks.
Cyber-attacks can have many effects depending on what
specific entity is attacked, and the level of the breach. For example,
energy company BP reports 50,000 attempted cyber-attacks per day.54
These intrusions can range from something as harmless (albeit
annoying) as taking down the website to keep web browsers from
learning more about the company, to a highly-damaging intrusion
that steals long-term strategy, confidential project-related employee
emails, or proprietary information regarding a company’s
manufacturing process. The National Nuclear Security
Administration, an agency tasked with the military application of
nuclear science, records 10 million hacks a day.55 Given that the
National Nuclear Security Administration handles nuclear security for
the United States and assists the military in determining the
effectiveness of nuclear weapons,56 a successful cyber-attack on this
organization could be disastrous to international security.
Financial institutions can suffer greatly from a cyber-attack.
For example, in June of 2016 the international consulting firm
Deloitte published a report outlining 14 business impacts of a cyberincident.57

Michael Tomaso, BP Fights Off Up to 50,000 Cyber-Attacks a Day: CEO,
CNBC.Com (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/100529483.
55 Jason Koebler, U.S. Nukes Face Up to 10 Million Cyber Attacks Daily, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/03/20/us-nukes-face-up-to-10-million-cyber-attacks-daily.
56 Our
Mission, NAT’L NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMIN, https://nnsa
.energy.gov/ourmission.
57 See Deloitte, Press Release (June 15, 2016)(listing customer breach
notifications; post-breach customer protection; regulatory compliance; public
relations/crisis communications; attorney fees and litigation; cybersecurity
improvements; technical investigations; insurance premium increases; increased
cost for debt raising; operational disruption or destruction; lost value of customer
relationships; lost contract revenue; devaluation of trade name; and loss of
intellectual property).
54
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C. Money Laundering
“Simply put, money laundering is the process of making dirty
money look clean.”58 That is money laundering in a nutshell, but the
simplicity of the statement hides the complexity of the crime. For
example, money laundering is not just about cash; the Financial
Action Task Force (“FATF”) has demonstrated “that money
laundering can be achieved through virtually every medium, financial
institution or business.”59 Though once considered integral only with
drug trafficking, money laundering is a necessary step in virtually any
criminal activity yielding profits.60
Criminals launder money for three reasons. First, it represents
the lifeblood of the organization allowing members to cover
expenses, maintain inventories, bribe officials, expand illegal
enterprises, and finance their lifestyles.61 Second, it would be foolish
to take money directly from these enterprises for those purposes, as
law enforcement can easily trace the funds’ origin. 62 Third, these
criminal proceeds can be the target of investigation and seizure.63
Consequently, criminals have a high incentive to conceal the
existence of these funds or make illegal proceeds appear legitimate to
confound law enforcement and continue the criminal enterprise.64
Generally, money laundering can be divided into three stages:
(1) placement, (2) layering, and (3) integration. Placement, as the first
step, is “the physical disposal of cash or other assets derived from
criminal activity.”65 The funds can be placed into the financial system,
or they can be placed into casinos, shops, and other businesses. 66
58 Study Guide for the ACAMS Certification Examination 13, ASSOC. OF
CERTIFIED ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SPECIALISTS, (5th ed. 2015).
59 Id. at 14.
60 William R. Schroeder, Money Laundering: A Global Threat and the
International Community’s Response, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1 (FBI, D.C.),
(May 2001).
61 Id. at 1.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Schroeder, supra note 60, at 15.
66 Id. at 15.
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Layering, the second step, consists of separating illegal proceeds
from their source through layers of financial transactions intended to
conceal the origin of the proceeds.67 Layering “involves converting
the proceeds of the crime into another form and creating complex
layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail, source and
ownership of funds.”68 The final step of the process is integration. In
integration, money is reintroduced into the economy through various
methods making it almost impossible for the funds to be traced back
to their illicit origin. 69
Money laundering affects the economy and society in various
ways, and while these effects are present in the United States, they
tend to be more pronounced in emerging markets.70 Consequently,
emerging markets serve as effective examples when studying the
consequences of money laundering. The World Bank has identified
five areas where money laundering affects developing countries:
1.

Increased crime and corruption;

2.

Damaged reputations and international consequences;

3.

Weakened financial institutions;

4.

Compromised economy and financial sector; and

5.

Damaged privatization efforts.71

Let’s focus on 1, 3, and 4. It should come as no surprise that
when a country is viewed as a money-laundering haven, criminals are
likely to go there.72 This in turn generates more crime and
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16.
69 Id. at 18.
70 John McDowell & Gary Novis, BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime,
U.S. Dep’t of State 7 (May 2001).
71 Paul Allen Schott, Reference Guide to Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism, THE WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
Section II at II-1 (2006)[hereinafter “The World Bank”].
72 Id. at II-2.
67
68
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corruption. 73 Finally, it also encourages bribery in functionaries that
are critical to the economy, including lawyers.74
Financial institutions face unique threats from money
laundering because financial transactions can occur instantaneously.
Typically, the risks faced by financial institutions due to money
laundering can be categorized as reputational, operational, or legal
and concentration risks.75 Reputational risk is defined as the risk that
public perception of a bank’s business practices and associations,
regardless of their accuracy, will cause a decline in the public’s
confidence in the institution and its integrity. 76 Operational risk is the
loss potential from inadequate or failed internal procedures, whether
systems-based or human-based.77 Legal risk is the risk of lawsuits,
adverse judgments, unenforceable contracts, fines and penalties
generating losses, increased expenses, or even institution closure. 78
Finally, Concentration risk is the loss potential of a company due to
credit or loan exposure to borrowers.79 For example, when a bank
lacks knowledge about a customer, the customer’s business, or the
customer’s status with other creditors, the Bank has concentration
risk.80

Id. at II-3.
Id. at II-3. Whether lawyers should report a client’s suspicious
transactions has long been the subject of controversy. See AM. BAR ASSOC.,
STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 463,
CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY LAUNDERING, & TERRORIST FINANCING (May
23, 2013) (providing risk-based control measures to assist lawyers in avoiding aiding
illegal activities “consistent with the Model Rules.”); Joel Schectman, U.S. Lawyers
Are A Money Laundering Blindspot, Some Argue, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 5:30 A.M.
ET) (discussing the controversy over whether lawyers in the United States should
report suspicious transactions as attorneys must do in the European Union); See
generally Adam K. Weinstein, Prosecuting Attorneys for Money Laundering, 51 DUKE L. J.
371, 372, 378-386 (1988) (arguing that “subjecting attorneys to criminal and civil
prosecution violates their clients’ right to counsel, right to counsel of choice, and
right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
75 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-4.
76 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
77 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
78 Id. at II-5 (citation omitted).
79 Id. at II-5.
80 Id. at II-5.
73
74
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Many recent cases highlight the dangers financial institutions
face in money laundering. HSBC’s recent $1.9 billion settlement with
the United States government is a salient example of how money
laundering affects financial institutions. 81 HSBC “failed to apply
legally required money laundering controls to $200 trillion in wire
transfers alone, in only a three year period.”82 In fact, the Bank’s
inadequacies were so great that the DOJ discouraged HSBC from
publicizing the incident to avoid further criminal exploitation of
HSBC’s compliance gaps.83
Money launderers commonly use “front companies,” which
appear legitimate and engage in legitimate business, but are controlled
by criminals.84 Front companies are not concerned with making a
profit; they are concerned with preserving and protecting illegitimate
funds.85 Front companies have access to illicit funds that can be used
to subsidize the front company’s products and services. As a result,
this makes it difficult for legitimate enterprises to compete with those
front-companies that need-not rely on the company’s actual revenue
to continue operations.86 If a criminal organization gets big enough,
the organization can control entire sectors of the economy, which in
turn leads to economic instability due to a misallocation of resources
from “artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices.”87 Front

81 See Heather A. Lowe, Money Laundering & HSBC – How it affects you,
REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2013, 22:01 GMT) (discussed supra and infra). HSBC avoided an
indictment because state and federal authorities concluded that criminal charges
would jeopardize the bank and destabilize the financial system. Ben Protess &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012 4:10 P.M.)
82 Id.
83 James Ball & Harry Davies, HSBC money-laundering procedures “have flaws too
bad to be revealed,” GUARDIAN (Jun. 5, 2015, 10:10 EDT), http://www.theguardian
.com/business/2015/jun/05/hsbc-money-laundering-procedures-flaws-too-badto-be-revealed (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
84 The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6.
85 Id. at II-6.
86 Id. at II-6.
87 Id. at II-6 (citing John McDowell & Gary Novis, Economic Perspectives,
U.S. State Dep’t, May 2001).
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companies can also serve as a tax-evasion vehicle, depriving a country
of revenue it would have otherwise received.88
In the United States, organized crime has used pizza parlors
to launder heroin trafficking proceeds.89 The “Pizza Connection
Trial” lasted from September 30th, 1985 and ended on March 2nd,
1987, making it the longest federal criminal trial in the Southern
District of New York at the time.90 19 defendants in a Mafia group
ranging from Brazil, Sicily, New York and the Midwest were charged
in participation of a drug ring trafficking heroin and cocaine,
laundering tens of millions of dollars through the use of pizza
restaurants as fronts.91 The case – led by then-federal prosecutor
Rudolph Giuliani and involving former-prosecutor Louis B. Freeh–
cost millions of dollars to complete. 92 These tens of millions of
dollars undoubtedly created the distortions mentioned above, and
ultimately 17 of the defendants were found guilty.93
In the United States, the methods of money laundering have
remained stable for the past ten years.94 They can be classified as one
of the following methods:

The World Bank, supra note 71, at II-6.
John McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and
Financial Crime, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (Dep’t of State, D.C.) (May 2001), at 7,
http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/ijee0501.pdf (last accessed Mar.
26th, 2016).
90 Ralph Blumenthal, Acquitted in “Pizza Connection Trial,” Man Remains in
Prison, N.Y. Times (Jul. 28, 1988), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/
28/nyregion/acquitted-in-pizza-connection-trial-man-remains-in-prison.html.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. To learn more about the Pizza Connection Trial, see generally Shana
Alexander, THE PIZZA CONNECTION: LAWYERS, MONEY, DRUGS, MAFIA (1988)
(discussing the trial); see also John Surico, How Mafia Pizzeria Drug Fronts Inspired One
of the Most Complex Criminal Trials Ever, VICE (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.vice.com/read/how-mafia-pizzeria-drug-fronts-inspired-one-of-themost-complex-criminal-trials-ever (“’It was a trial with no end in sight involving a
billion puzzle pieces,” said [organized crime expert] David Amoruso . . . “all of its
participants – defendants, lawyers, prosecutors, jurors, and the judge - had to do
their best not to be driven totally insane.”).
94 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK
ASSESSMENT 3 (2015) (“This assessment finds that the underlying money
88
89
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1.

Use of cash and monetary instruments in amounts under
regulatory recordkeeping and reporting thresholds;

2.

Opening bank and brokerage accounts using nominees
to disguise the identity of the individuals who control the
accounts;

3.

Creating legal entities without accurate information about
the identity of the beneficial owner;

4.

Misuse of products and services resulting from deficient
compliance with anti-money laundering obligations; and

5.

Merchants and financial institutions wittingly facilitating
illicit activity.95

By reviewing the above methods, one may notice that all five
methods relate to financial institutions. These funds derive mainly
from fraud and drug trafficking.96 Fraud covers a wide range of
crimes, like healthcare fraud, federal government payments fraud, and
identity fraud.97 Drug trafficking alone generates an estimated $64
billion in cash per year.98 Furthermore, recent evidence suggests the
severance of customer relationships between U.S. banks and Mexican
money exchangers, commonly known as “casas de cambio, 99 “has led
to increases in the retention and use of drug-related cash, both in the
United States and internationally, which has “shifted money
laundering activity from Mexico to the United States.”100

laundering vulnerabilities remain largely the same as those identified in the 2005
United States Money Laundering Threat Assessment.”)
95 Id. at 3.
96 Id. at 2.
97 Id. at 2.
98 Id. at 2.
99 Hannah Stone, US Targets Bank in Mexican Money Laundering Crackdown,
INSIGHT CRIME, “Exchange houses which are often used by Mexican criminal
groups to launder funds.” available at http://www.insightcrime.org/newsanalysis/us-targets-bank-in-mexico-money-laundering-crackdown
100 Id. at 3.
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Now, one can also imagine how a criminal, state actor, or
non-state actor might try and bypass cyber-security protocols to
commit a crime, and then launder the proceeds of the crime. For
example, in 2015 a gang of hackers infiltrated more than 100 banks in
30 countries.101 At the time of the hack, employees were unknowingly
opening emails that allowed hackers to insert malware.102 This
malware manipulated the banks’ cyber-security protocols and
proceeded to and siphon as much as $1 billion directly from the
banks over a two-year period. 103 To cover their tracks the hackers
layered the proceeds into their own accounts.104
A further example can be found in a FINRA report from
February 2016 describing an incident where foreign customers
considered to be “high-risk” opened four accounts with an online
firm and engaged in patterns of fraudulent trading through the firm’s
Direct Market Access (DMA) platform.105 These customers hacked
other online broker-dealers’ accounts, engaging in a short sale
schemes that resulted in large profits for the customers’ of the firm
through their accounts, and losses in the compromised broker-dealer
accounts.106 FINRA punished the online firm for “failing to establish
and implement [AML] policies and procedures adequately tailored to
the firm’s online business in order to detect and cause the reporting
of suspicious activity; and . . . failing to establish and implement a
reasonably designed customer identification program to adequately
verify customer identity.”107
Curiously, NYDFS has recognized the intersection of AML
and cyber-security on prior occasions such as when the agency issued
101 Thomas Bock, The Convergence of Anti-Money Laundering and Bank Security,
K2 Intelligence (Nov. 2015), available at https://www.k2intelligence.com/
en/insights/thought-leadership/the-convergence-of-anti-money-laundering-andcyber-security.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 FINRA, REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES (Feb. 2015), available at
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/p602363%20Report%20on%20Cybersec
urity%20Practices_0.pdf.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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its BitLicense regulations.108 These regulations required financial
institutions to have designated compliance personnel and AML
procedures that are the same as those for institutions handling
traditional, fiat currency.109
The United States Department of Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has also started making the
connection between cyber-security breaches and money laundering
schemes.110 FinCEN has recently begun to encourage financial
institutions to include information on cyber-security events or
breaches on Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”).111 Specifically, the
guidelines provide guidance for SAR reporting in connection with:
cyber-enabled crime and cyber events; the inclusion of relevant
cyber-related information in SARs; encouraging collaboration
between cybersecurity units and AML units within the same firm; and
sharing cyber-related information across financial institutions to
combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and cyber-attacks.112
The efficacy of linking a cybersecurity event to a SAR is evidenced by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of a SAR to trace $7 million
dollars from a Florida bank account to criminals in Russia and
Ukraine that had released a “Zeus” botnet virus to make the
fraudulent withdrawal.113
The convergence of opinion between government
recommendations and consultants in the private sector point to a
growing consensus that, while AML and cyber-security practices do
not and cannot have complete overlap in their functions, they do
have significant overlap in their goals and methods. It would seem
that two functions within the same organization with significantly
overlapping missions would have similar regulatory liability when

See generally Bock supra note 104.
Id.
110 Chris Kentours, Cybersecurity and AML: How the Twain Must Meet?,
FINOPS REPORT (Nov. 10, 2016), available at http://finops.co/slider/cybersecurityand-aml-how-the-twain-must-meet/.
111 Id.
112 Id; See also Clifford Chance PDF (internal citations omitted) (Note that
the advisory does not change any of the existing laws).
113 Kentours, supra note 112 at Id.
108
109
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managers in those groups fail to fulfill their duties. As we will see in
the next section, this is not the case.
III.

THE RULE, INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE LIABILITY, AND
SUGGESTIONS

In 2013, the NYDFS conducted a survey on cyber-security.114
60 community and regional banks, 12 credit unions, and 82 foreign
branches and agencies participated in the NYDFS’s questionnaire.
The questionnaire asked questions about “each participant’s
information security framework; corporate governance around cyber
security; use and frequency of penetration testing and results; budget
and costs associated with cyber security; the frequency, nature, cost
of, and response to cyber security breaches; and future plans on cyber
security.”115 NYDFS also met with “depository institutions and
cybersecurity experts . . . to discuss industry trends, concerns, and
opportunities for improvement.”116
NYDFS’s findings discussed management of information
technology systems; information security frameworks; use of security
technologies; penetration testing; budget and costs; corporate
governance; cybersecurity incidents and breaches; and planning for
the future.117 Most institutions experienced intrusions, and the larger
the institution, the more likely it was to experience malware and
phishing attempts.118
It was further noted that larger institutions were more likely
to experience financial losses after a cyber-attack.119 These institutions
were also reported to be more likely to have a cybersecurity plan

Report on Cyber Security in the Banking Sector, N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN.
SERVS. (May 2014), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/dfs_cyber
_banking_report_052014.pdf.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
114
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instituted than their smaller counterparts.120 Recent examples help
illustrate this last point. In 2011, more than 300,000 Citibank
accounts were compromised in a targeted hack.121 In 2012, a cyberattack focused on employee login credentials at Bank of America and
Wells Fargo.122
An April 2015 update on the NYDFS report focused on
third-party security service providers, as well as steps taken to
implement the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of
Standards and Technology.123 Most of the institutions involved had
taken or were taking steps to implement NIST principles, but the
application of those principles varied across institutions.124 Ultimately,
the report concluded that banks were taking steps to increase
cybersecurity, although progress varied depending on an institution’s
size and type.125
On September 13th, 2016, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo announced “first-in-the-nation” regulations to protect New
York financial institutions from cyber-attacks.126 In his remarks,
Governor Cuomo said:
“New York, the financial capital of the world, is leading the
nation in taking decisive action to our consumers and our financial
system from serious economic harm that is often perpetrated by
state-sponsored organizations, terrorist networks, and other criminal
enterprises. This regulation helps guarantee the financial services
Id.
Banks Likely to Remain Top Cybercrime Targets, SYMANTEC (last accessed
Nov. 30, 2016), available at https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us
/enterprise/other_resources/b_Financial_Attacks_Exec_Report.pdf. See also, Press
Release, CitiGroup Inc., Updated Information on Recent Compromise to Citi
Account Online for Our Customers, (June 15, 2011), available at
http://citigroup.com/citi/press/2011/110610c.htm.
122 Id.
123 Press Release, NYS Department of Financial Services, Update on Cyber
Security in the Banking Sector: Third Party Service Providers, NYS DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES, (April 2015), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/
dfs_rpt_tpvendor_042015.pdf [hereinafter “2015 Report”].
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Governor Cuomo Press Release, supra note 8.
120
121
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industry upholds its obligation to protect consumers and ensure that
its systems are sufficiently constructed to prevent cyber-attacks to the
fullest extent possible.”127
The proposed regulation includes proposals designed to
balance “certain regulatory minimum standards while maintaining
flexibility so that the final rule does not limit industry innovation and
instead encourages firms to keep pace with technological
advances.”128 Although this article is not intended to provide a
thorough analysis of the components contained within either the
cyber-security rule, or the AML rule, a brief overview nonetheless
provides helpful context in regards to the certification rules.
The cybersecurity program requires every covered entity129 to
establish and maintain a cybersecurity program to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and the availability of its Information
Systems,130 which, among other things, means “a discrete set of
electronic information resources organized for the collection,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination or disposition of electronic
information.”131 Covered entities are to implement and maintain a
written cybersecurity policy setting forth policies and procedures in
order to protect Information Systems and private information stored
on those systems. The minimum policy standards require covered
entities to address:
1.

Information security;

2.

Data governance and classification;

3.

Access controls and identity management;

Id.
Id.
129 “[A]ny [individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other entity]
operating under or required to operate under a license, registration, charter,
certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization under the banking law, the
insurance law, or the financial services law.”
130 Press Release, Proposed Regulations: Section 500.00, N.Y. DEP’T FIN.
SERVS. (September 2016), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations
/proposed/rp500t.pdf(last accessed Sept. 2016).
131 Id.
127
128
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4.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning and
resources;

5.

Capacity and performance planning;

6.

Systems operations and availability concerns;

7.

Systems and network security;

8.

Systems and network monitoring;

9.

Systems and application development and quality
assurance;

10. Physical security and environmental controls;
11. Customer data privacy;
12. Vendor and third-party service provider management;
13. Risk assessment; and
14. Incident response.132
This requires the board of directors or an equivalent
governing body to review the policy as frequently as necessary (but
no less frequently than annually), and a senior officer to approve of
the policy’s contents.133
The proposed regulation also contained an annual
certification of compliance requirement.134 Every covered entity135
must certify that it follows the requirements of the regulation. 136 The
Id.
Id.
134 Press Release, Maria T. Vullo, Notice of Final Regulations’ Promulgation
under Part 500 Title 23 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and
Regulations of the State of New York: Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial
Services
Companies,
500.17(b),
(Feb.
13,
2017),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsrf500txt.pdf.
135 Id.
136 Id.
132
133
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language of the certification is found in Appendix A and reads as
follows:
The Board of Directors or a Senior Officer of the
Covered Entity certifies:
(1) The Board of Directors (or name of Senior
Officer(s)) have reviewed documents, reports,
certifications and opinions of such officers,
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other
individuals or entities as necessary;
To the best of the (Board of Directors) or (name of
Senior Officer(s)) knowledge, the Cybersecurity
Program of (name of Covered Entity as of ___ (date
of the Board Resolution or Senior Officer(s)
Compliance Finding) for the year ended ____ (year
for which Board Resolution or Compliance Finding is
provided) complies with Part __.
Signed [and dated] by the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors or Senior Officer(s).
Failure to certify will be enforced under “any
applicable laws,” including civil and criminal
penalties.137
NYDFS’s final cybersecurity regulations went into effect
March 1st, 2017.138 In a February 16, 2017 press release, New York
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo said:

Id.; see also PwC, AML monitoring: New York regulator gets prescriptive,
FINANCIAL
CRIMES
OBSERVER
PWC,
(July
2016),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financial-crimes/publications/asse
ts/aml-monitoring-nydfs-2016.pdf [hereinafter “PwC”].
138 Press Release, Governor Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces First-inthe-Nation Cybersecurity Regulation Protecting Consumers and Financial
Institutions from Cyber-Attacks to Take Effect March 1, (February 16, 2017),
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1702161.htm.
137
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New York is the financial capital of the world, and it
is critical that we do everything in our power to
protect consumers and our financial system from the
ever increasing threat of cyber-attacks . . . These
strong, first-in-the-nation protections will help ensure
this industry has the necessary safeguards in place in
order to protect themselves and the New Yorkers
they serve from the serious economic harm caused by
these devastating cyber-crimes.139
The final regulation includes
•

Controls relating to the governance framework for a
robust cybersecurity program including requirements for
a program that is adequately funded and staffed,
overseen by qualified management, and reported on
periodically to the most senior governing body of the
organization;

•

Risk-based minimum standards for technology systems
including access controls, data protection including
encryption, and penetration testing;

•

Required minimum standards to help address any cyber
breaches including an incident response plan,
preservation of data to respond to such breaches, and
notice to DFS of material events; and

•

Accountability by requiring identification and
documentation of material deficiencies, remediation
plans and annual certifications of regulatory compliance
to DFS.140

Section 500.20, which covers enforcement, says that “This
regulation will be enforced by the superintendent pursuant to, and is

139
140

Id.
Id.
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not intended to limit, the superintendent’s authority under any
applicable laws.”141
So far - so good. However, in June 2016, NYDFS had issued
a similar final rule regarding AML compliance certification. 142 This
issuance was a result of multiple NYDFS investigations into
compliance at “regulated institutions” (“all banks, trust companies,
private bankers, savings banks and savings and loans associations
chartered under New York Banking Law, New York-licensed
branches and agencies of foreign banking corporations, as well as
New York-licensed check cashiers and money transmitters[]”143) with
applicable money laundering rules.144 The investigation identified
shortcomings in these financial institution’s transaction monitoring
and filtering programs, which was in turn attributable to a lack of
governance, oversight, and accountability at senior levels.145 Based on
this investigation and other factors, NYDFS believed financial
institutions had systemic shortcomings in their AML programs and
wanted to not only clarify AML program requirements, but also have
the Board of Directors or a Senior Officer submit a Board Resolution
or Compliance Finding. 146
The final AML rules require every regulated institution to
maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program that should contain,
where applicable, the following attributes:
1.

Based on the institution’s Risk Assessment;

Supra note 10.
Publication, Shearman & Sterling LLP, NYS Department of Financial
Services Outlines Requirements for Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs of NY StateLicensed Institutions, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP CLIENT PUBLICATIONS (Jul. 20,
2016), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/
Publications/2016/07/NYS-Department-of-Financial-Services-Outlines-Requirem
ents-FIAFR-072016.pdf [hereinafter “Shearman and Sterling”].
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
141
142
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2.

Periodically reviewed and updated to reflect and account
for changes to BSA/AML laws and other relevant
information;

3.

Match BSA/AML risks to the firm’s business, product
and service lines, and customers;

4.

BSA/AML detection scenarios with values and amounts
that detect potential money laundering, suspicious
activity, or other illegal activity;

5.

A full scope testing of the Transaction Monitoring
Program, including governance review, data mapping,
transaction coding, detection scenario logic, model
validation, data input and Program output;

6.

Documentation articulating the institution’s current
detection scenarios and the assumptions, thresholds, and
parameters of those scenarios;

7.

Protocols outlining how the firm will investigate the
Transaction Monitoring Program’s alerts, how the
Regulated Institution will decide which alerts will result
in a filing or other action, who is responsible for
deciding, and how the investigative and decision-making
process is to be documented; and

8.

Be subject to on-going analysis in order to determine
whether detection scenarios, underlying rules, threshold
values, parameters, and assumptions are still relevant.147

The Regulated Institution’s Filtering Program’s requirements
are similar to the Monitoring Program in that they are only to be
implemented where applicable, and are as follows:
1.

147

Be based on the institution’s Risk Assessment;

Id.
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2.

Be based on technology, processes, or tools that will
match names and accounts consistent with the
institution’s risks, transaction, and product profiles;

3.

Full scope testing of the Filtering Program, including
relevant reviews of data matching, determining whether
the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings
synchronize to an institution’s risks; assessing the logical
fit of technology or tools, model validation, and data
input with the Program’s output;

4.

On-going analysis to assess technology and tool’s logic
and performance in matching names and accounts, as
well as the OFAC sanctions list and threshold settings to
see if they map the institution’s risks, and

5.

Documentation articulating the Filtering Program’s
intent and design for tools, processes, and
technology. 148

Both the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Programs are
required to have, where applicable:

148

1.

ID of all data sources with relevant data;

2.

Validation of data’s accuracy, integrity, and quality,
ensuring accurate and complete data flows through the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program;

3.

Processes for data extraction and loading to ensure a
complete and accurate data transfer from source to
system (provided automated systems are used)

4.

Governance and management oversight, including
policies and procedures that govern changes to the
Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program ensuring
that changes are managed, reported, audited, defined, and
controlled;

Id.
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5.

Vendor selection processes where third-party vendors are
used in the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering
Program;

6.

Funding for the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering
Program;

7.

Qualified personnel or third-party consultants
responsible for various aspects of the Transaction
Monitoring and Filtering Program, including design,
implementation, ongoing analysis, planning, operation
testing, and

8.

Periodic training of all Transaction Monitoring and
Filtering Program stakeholders.149

When Regulated Institutions identify areas, systems, or
processes needing material improvements, updates, or redesigns, the
Regulated Institutions are required to document the identifications
made, and the corresponding planned remedial efforts. The
Superintendent of NYDFS must be able to view these
documents.150
Either the board or the senior officers of a company must
certify that the company has followed these rules outlined above. The
Board Resolution or Compliance Finding requirement dictates that:
[E]ach Regulated Institution “shall adopt and submit
to the Superintendent a Board Resolution or Senior
Officer(s) Compliance Finding in the form set forth
in Attachment A by April 15th of each year. Each
Regulated Institution shall maintain for examination
by the Department all records, schedules and data
supporting adoption of the Board Resolution or

149
150

Id.
Id.
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Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding for a period of
five years.151
The language of the aforementioned certification is as
follows:
The Board of Directors (or name of Senior
Officer(s)) has reviewed documents, reports,
certifications and opinions of such officers,
employees, representatives, outside vendors and other
individuals or entities as necessary to adopt this Board
Resolution or Senior Officer Compliance Finding.
The Board of Directors or Senior Officer(s) has taken
all steps necessary to confirm that (name of Regulated
Institution) as of ___ (date of the Board Resolution
or Senior Officer(s) Compliance Finding) for the year
ended ___ (year for which Board Resolution or
Compliance Finding is provided) complies with
[Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Requirements].
Signed [and dated] by each member of the Board of
Directors or Senior Officer(s).152
In the final rule, these requirements are to “be enforced
pursuant to, and is not intended to limit, the Superintendent’s
authority under any applicable laws.”153 Thus, the scope of the
Superintendent’s authority is both civil and criminal. However, the
original wording of the rule was harsh, as illustrated below:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all
applicable penalties provided for by the Banking Law
and the Financial Services Law for failure to maintain
a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a Watch List
Id.
Banking Division Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program
Requirements and Certifications, 3 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 504 (Mar. 2017), available at
http://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2016/july20/pdf/rulemaking.pdf and
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp504t.pdf.
153 Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142.
151
152

103

MAINTAINING INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY - REFERENCES?.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4/27/2017

5:1

Filtering Program complying with the requirements of
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications
required under Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying
Senior Officer who files an incorrect or false Annual
Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties
for such filing.154
It is unclear why the original language was worded as it was.
More than likely, the language intended to serve two purposes: (1) to
underline the seriousness of the offense, and (2) to warn potential
officers certifying the Annual Certification of the consequences
resulting from a failure to certify the company’s program.
Regardless, due to industry feedback that language was struck
out entirely and replaced with new language for the finalized rule. In
the final rule, NYDFS removed the threat of criminal penalties for
incorrect or falsified filings.155
Thus, there are meaningful distinctions between the
requirements of the cybersecurity rule and the AML rule. However,
the reality of modern financial institutions means that AML is a
significant component of cybersecurity, such that AML measures
cannot be effective without cybersecurity, and cybersecurity in
financial institutions cannot be fully effective without AML measures.
In the following section, I will explain why the current rules require
some form of harmonization in their application and enforcement,
and further, why those rules need to establish a specific standard for
the imposition of criminal liability in specific instances.
IV.

SUGGESTIONS AND RATIONALE

Both the cybersecurity rules and the AML rules should have
the same language, however, they do not. Unfortunately, both rules
lack much-needed language allowing for the imposition of criminal
liability in appropriate situations. This problem could be addressed
154
155

Id.
PwC, supra note 137.
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through a number of ways and considerations. First, one must
consider that by softening the language in both rules, the NYDFS
was not responsive to institutions’ vocalized concerns, and likely only
further confused individuals trying to comply. Second, if both rules
contain the same language, the possibility of corporate directors
avoiding liability in one function, while negating liability in another
for the same act, will likely lessen. Third, by emphasizing the
potential of corporate criminal liability the rule will more properly
reflect the principles outlined by the Yates memorandum. Even
though the Yates memorandum is not an official policy of the New
York Attorney General’s Office, aligning the language of the rules
with the spirit of the Yates memorandum could eliminate the
complexity created by the current compliance rules for company
directors.
A. Changing the Language of the Statute but not the Underlying
Enforcement Mechanism is Unresponsive to Concerns and Only
Confuses Firms Trying to Comply with the Rule
In response to public comments regarding the rule, the
NYSFDS changed the AML rule’s language so that the regulation
“[would] be enforced pursuant to, and [] not intended to limit, the
Superintendent’s authority under any applicable laws.”156 Although
the laws are not explicitly mentioned, the language of the AML rule
presumably refers to legislation relating to Banking, Insurance, and
Financial law. However, if this is true, the NYSFDS is committing
two errors.
First, by not changing the underlying penalties of the law, the
NYSFDS is not being responsive enough to the concerns of
commenters. Secondly, by stating only that regulators will pursue
enforcement under “any and all applicable laws,” individuals are left
“in the dark” about specific applicable law. If we were to assume that
a law’s ability to be interpreted directly influences the law’s likelihood
of being followed, then one must also consider the vagueness of this
rule and its resultant effect on compliance.
156

Shearman and Sterling, supra note 142.
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This problem of vagueness in compliance can also be found
in the proposed cybersecurity rule. Like the AML rule, the
cybersecurity rule only states that the Superintendent will enforce the
Regulation pursuant to “authority under any applicable laws.”157 One
can only speculate why the rule is phrased this way. Perhaps this
phraseology was a response to the public comment regarding the
AML rules and was intended to preemptively address similar
complaints about the AML rule. Again, however, this language is
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This lack of clarity
could feasibly hinder corporations from ensuring which laws are
applicable, and consequently, what standards to adhere to when
certifying their cybersecurity programs.
Furthermore, rule-makers determined that the prior language
was not precise enough to warrant inclusion. As we have seen,
cybersecurity breaches and AML risks are frequent. Thus, this
arguably makes individual penalization through criminal liability
unjust in certain situations, such as, for example, the filing of false or
incorrect Annual Certifications in good faith. Beyond that, a variety
of scenarios could occur: firms may have to start offering large
salaries to compliance officers just to attract quality talent, or, firms
may feel encouraged to structure their company in such a way that
does not require a New York state business charter, and thus
bypassing the rule. In a true nightmare scenario, firms could just
dissolve their charters, leave New York, and set up shop in
alternative financial centers such as San Francisco, Boston, Chicago,
Charlotte, or Washington, D.C.
B. Uniform Language as a Response to Dual Corporate Officer
Liability Loopholes
As the rules are currently written, it is entirely possible that an
individual could face criminal liability for a certification violation in
the cybersecurity context, yet simultaneously avoid criminal liability
under the AML rules. To be sure, in some situations this will not be
relevant. For example, suppose that there is a cybersecurity breach of

157

Vullo, supra note 134.
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a financial institution based on corporate espionage. If, after an
individual makes a bad faith cybersecurity certification, a hacker gets
into an employee’s email, he may learn of a new marketing campaign,
the valuation of a confidential M&A deal, or proprietary research
created by a firm’s research team. Cybersecurity breaches involving
financial institutions are often related to some form of money
laundering activity. Such breaches are cybersecurity breaches,
although they do not involve the laundering of money.
However, in situations where a cybersecurity breach does
involve money laundering, if both the cybersecurity policy and money
laundering policy were certified by an individual omission or outright
lie, it is possible that the individual could avoid liability under the
AML rule, but not the cybersecurity rule. A predictable argument
could be that criminal prosecution under the AML rule is unfair
because the language change from the proposed rule to the final rule
reflects a retraction in the intended harshness of the policy against
criminal prosecution. Thus, it is foreseeable that criminal liability was
not intended to be permissible for AML violations, and the rule is
thus arguably be unconstitutional for being overly vague.
However, if both rules were to have the exact same language,
two results would occur. First, loopholes are no longer present in
those situations where both rules apply, but with contrasting
language. Second, assuming all elements are met, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for an individual to argue that it was unclear
whether their failure to comply with the certification mechanism
would allow for criminal liability sanctions.
C. The Yates Memorandum & Creating a Comprehensive Model
Having a rule that reflects the Yates memorandum not only
makes the rule easier to follow, but also sets good precedent for
further states’ adoption and implementation. Responding to industry
concerns, eliminating the possibility of loopholes, and creating
precise language are key aspects of the new language. The next and
final element is that the new language should reflect the tenor of the
Yates memorandum, such that it makes the rule easier to follow, but
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also sets a good precedent for other states to copy should they
choose to implement their own state policies.
Again, it bears repeating that the Yates memorandum,
technically, has no bearing on the New York Attorney General’s
Office or the NYDFS. After all, the Yates memorandum is part of
the DOJ, and thus reflects federal policy. However, many New York
banks have not worked solely within the confines of New York for
quite some time: indeed, it is hard to recall when New York banks
operated solely within the United States. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan
and Deutsche Bank are just a few New York chartered organizations
with international reach.158 As such, in their operations these
institutions are subject to not just New York law, but federal law as
well. Despite New York’s outsized influence within the financial
sector, common practice for these organizations is to channel their
resources towards federal law compliance.
There is another advantage to this. By making the rule
reflective of the Yates memorandum and easier to follow, it removes
an incentive for an organization to move its banking charter from
New York to another state with more relaxed banking standards.
V.

THE NEW RULE

If the current language and the proposed language of both
the cybersecurity and AML certification policies are not adequate,
then what is? This author proposes the following rules for the
cybersecurity and AML programs, respectively. For cybersecurity:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services
Law for failure to maintain a cybersecurity program complying with
the requirements of this Part and or failure to file the Certifications
required under Section 500.17 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer
See generally Report, New York State Chartered Institutions as of
December 31, 2012, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERVS. (Dec. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/annual/annualbanklist.htm.
158
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who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false
Annual Certification also may be subject to criminal penalties for
such filing.
Then, for the AML:
All Regulated Institutions shall be subject to all applicable
penalties provided for by the Banking Law and the Financial Services
Law for failure to maintain a Transaction Monitoring Program, or a
Watch List Filtering Program complying with the requirements of
this Part and or failure to file the Certifications required under
Section 504.4 hereof. A Certifying Senior Officer who intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly files an incorrect or false Annual Certification
also may be subject to criminal penalties for such filing.
This proposed language achieves two purposes. First, by
giving explicit standards, the language makes clear that a criminal
enforcement will only be triggered where an individual’s behavior
manifests a level of intent beyond mere negligence. The Haider case,
described supra, provides a clear example of when an individual
director’s failure to provide adequate internal controls was a result of
mere negligence. As illustrated by the Haider case, it would be unfair
to punish all individuals for negligence or strict liability offenses and
could lead to unintended consequences in an industry where
complete prevention has proven impossible. Second, and relatedly,
this proposed rule reflects the reality that AML and cybersecurity
divisions at certain financial institutions face extraordinary difficulties
and overlapping functions. The proposed rule is narrowly tailored to
prevent the behavior seen in Haider, or rather, violations conducted
by individuals intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; but not the
behavior of otherwise good-faith individuals who mistakenly certify a
compliance program. Distinguishing between negligent and reckless
conduct may be difficult at times, but nonetheless, this proposed rule
provides a minimum standard and guide for enforcement agencies to
adhere to.
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CONCLUSION

AML and cybersecurity are separate policies, yet, closely
intertwined and critical as a defense for financial institutions. These
institutions are constantly under attack from outsiders, and
unfortunately, bound to fall victim to a breach at some point. After
all, even if 10,000 attacks occur and 9,999 of them fail, all it takes is
one; hackers may still be successful in damaging a targeted institution,
even when the breach is minimally intrusive.
The New York State Department of Financial Services made
a mistake in weakening the language of its proposed rules. The
NYDFS was not responsive to industry concerns and the rules were
not written clearly enough to meaningfully advise parties affected by
the consequences of a failure to comply. By strengthening the
language so that clear consequences are understood and established,
and by setting a clear standard of what will trigger potential criminal
liability, this Author’s proposed language will serve the dual purpose
of reassuring individuals at firms of what actions would impose
criminal liability, and would further ensure the New York State
Department of Financial Services that its goal of increasing
cybersecurity and AML regulations has been met.
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